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ABSTRACT
There is an emerging policy and academic discussion, supported by a growing body of
empirical evidence, regarding the potentially positive effects of asset accumulation in lowincome households. However, at least two questions precede this discussion: Can the poor save?
And, if so, how can programs and policies promote saving by the poor? This paper begins to
address these questions through an interdisciplinary review of theory and empirical evidence on
saving. The first section summarizes existing theories of saving and asset accumulation. In the
second section, a general model of saving is presented. This model emphasizes contextual
influences as well as individual characteristics. Subsequent sections consider variables related to
ability to save and willingness to save, with an emphasis on poor and near-poor individuals. The
final section offers a discussion of research and policy implications, including a list of testable
propositions.
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HOW CAN THE POOR SAVE?
THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON SAVING IN LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS
During the past several years, asset accumulation has emerged as a new anti-poverty
strategy. The 1996 “welfare reform” law gives states the option to use block grant funds for
matched savings accounts for the poor and excludes these savings from asset limits in all meanstested programs. The emphasis on asset-holding has developed largely from an asset-based
theory of welfare proposed by Sherraden (1991). In addition to their role in future consumption,
Sherraden suggests that assets may improve household well-being in a number of other ways. He
posits, for example, that assets may improve household stability, create an orientation toward the
future, stimulate development of other assets, increase civic participation, and enhance the wellbeing of offspring. In fact, empirical research has identified a number of positive “asset effects,”
and there is reason to believe that these effects are most pronounced in low income households
(see Page-Adams and Sherraden, 1996, for a review).1 This focus on asset accumulation is
particularly timely, given the trend in the U.S. toward increased concentration of wealth (Wolff,
1995, Chapter 3).
Despite much enthusiasm for the new state and local asset development programs, some
remain skeptical about the likelihood that poor individuals will save. It is commonly assumed,
for example, that the poor are not motivated to save (e.g., they lack foresight, precaution, and/or
the desire to leave a bequest); that they do not have the discipline to save, even if they desire to
accumulate assets; or that deferred consumption is impossible, given their limited incomes.
Empirical evidence generally indicates that low-income households have lower-than-average
1

Although the notion that households are “better off” with assets may seem obvious, social welfare is generally
defined as income for consumption, particularly for the poor (Sherraden, 1990). As a result, U.S. social welfare
policy for the poor emphasizes almost exclusively the transfer of goods, services, and cash for immediate
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saving rates (see, e.g., Bhalla, 1980; Bunting, 1997; Diamond & Hausman, 1984; Mayer, 1966),2
but since much of the evidence is based on bivariate correlations, we know relatively little about
the true predictors of saving in low-income households. Moreover, existing theories of saving
largely focus on middle- and upper-classes.
With these issues in mind, this paper takes initial steps toward developing a theory of
saving in low-income households. The first section briefly summarizes existing theories of
saving and asset accumulation, and the second section develops a general model of saving. The
next two sections consider specific variables that may help to explain saving in low-income
households, with the third focusing specifically on the ability to save and the fourth on
“willingness” to save. The final section provides a detailed discussion of research and policy
implications, including testable propositions.

EXISTING THEORIES OF SAVING AND ASSET ACCUMULATION
This section briefly summarizes the key assumptions and propositions of existing theories
of saving and asset accumulation. These “theories,” which are actually at various stages of
theoretical development, may be roughly classified into four categories: 1) neoclassical
economic; 2) psychological and sociological; 3) behavioral; and 4) institutional.
Neoclassical Economic Theories
Neoclassical economic theories of saving are characterized by several common
assumptions. First, individuals are viewed as rational beings who seek to maximize pleasure and
minimize pain, and individual utility is assumed to be a function of consumption. Second, to

consumption needs. At the same time, many middle- and upper-income households benefit from a variety of policies
that encourage asset accumulation, most notably favorable tax treatment for home ownership and retirement savings.
2
Although Bernheim and Garrett (1996, Table 6) found that the relationship between earnings and saving rates was
weak, several studies suggest that saving rates are positively associated with education (Bernheim & Garrett, 1996;
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most mainstream economists, there is little difference between income and assets. Both
represent economic resources that may be used to finance consumption. At the same time,
neoclassical economists acknowledge that individuals must make choices between present and
future consumption. These choices are generally believed to be the product of stable,
autonomous individual “preferences” and the individual’s opportunity set. An individual’s
saving behavior is expected to reflect her preferences for present versus deferred consumption
and her income and wealth.
The two most well-known neoclassical theories of saving are the life cycle hypothesis
(Ando & Modigliani, 1963; Modigliani & Ando, 1957; Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954), and the
permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957). Both of these theories assume that individuals
and households are concerned about long-term consumption opportunities and therefore explain
saving and consumption in terms of expected future income. Proponents of these models view
saving as a way to smooth out consumption in the face of income fluctuations. Since
consumption is determined by anticipated lifetime resources (rather than current resources),
saving over short periods of time (e.g., a year) is expected to reflect departures of current income
from average life resources. In other words, according to these theories, when current income
falls below average expected lifetime income, saving decreases, and individuals and households
may even borrow to finance consumption. When current income exceeds average expected life
resources, individuals and households save.
As its name suggests, the life cycle hypothesis (LCH) posits that consumption and saving
will reflect an individual’s age or stage in the life cycle. Since retirement, for most people, is
likely to be the most substantial and enduring “income fluctuation,” this model emphasizes

Bernheim & Scholz, 1993; Hubbard, Skinner & Zeldes, 1995). Since education may be a better indicator of
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saving for retirement as a primary motivation for deferred consumption. (More complex LCH
models also consider the desire to leave a bequest and the desire to prepare for emergencies as
possible saving motives.) Young households are expected to have negative saving since they
typically have relatively low earnings and incur debt for education, the purchase of homes, and
other expenses. In the middle period of the life cycle, saving is likely to be positive because
individuals pay their debts and begin to save for retirement. Upon retirement, dissaving is
expected to occur again. Thus, differences in consumption and saving among households are
believed to be partly the product of age differences, and the pattern of saving and dissaving
creates an inverted U-shaped pattern (“hump saving,” according to Harrod, 1948) across age
categories and/or over time (Ando & Modigliani, 1963; Modigliani & Ando, 1957; Modigliani &
Brumberg, 1954).
Like the life cycle hypothesis, the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) assumes that longterm income is the primary determinant of consumption. The PIH, however, assumes that life is
indefinitely long and therefore focuses on permanent and transitory income rather than life
resources and current income. In this model, permanent income refers to the present value of
lifetime income, and transitory income refers to the difference between measured income and
permanent income. Friedman (1957) claims that household consumption will respond to changes
in permanent but not transitory income.3 Observed differences in household saving and
consumption are believed to reflect, in part, differences in the relative shares of transitory and
permanent income.

permanent income, these studies may also support the assumed relationship between income and saving.
3
In other words, when an individual experiences an increase in income that she perceives as temporary, she is likely
to consume relatively little of this money. If she expects the increase to be permanent, she is more likely to raise her
consumption standards. In its strongest form, the PIH posits that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of
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Psychological and Sociological Theories
Psychological and sociological theories of saving consider additional determinants of
household saving. These theories are grounded in the assumption that consumers’ tastes and
aspirations are not fixed, but instead are affected by economic or social stimuli and conditions.
Psychological theories in particular are frequently grounded in a stimulus-organism-response
framework whereby change in the environment or information received is viewed as a stimulus
which influences the individual (organism) and the response (Katona, 1975, p. 44).4
Economic psychologists examine how the effects of external stimuli on economic
behavior are conditioned by intervening variables such as motives, aspirations, and expectations
(Katona, 1975; Olander & Seipel, 1970; Strumpel, 1972; 1975; Van Raaij, 1989). Katona (1951;
1975) has posited that saving is a function of two sets of factors, ability to save and willingness
to save. The emphasis on ability to save acknowledges that some individuals, because of limited
economic resources or special consumption needs, find it more difficult to defer consumption
than others. At the same time, those individuals who can postpone consumption still must
choose to do so, a decision that requires some degree of willpower. In particular, Katona claims
that consumer expectations and sentiment determine households’ willingness to save.5 Other
psychological and sociological propositions consider the effects of families (Cohen, 1994), peers
(Duesenberry, 1949), and past savings experiences (Furnham, 1985; Katona, 1975) on
consumption patterns, savings-related beliefs, and aspirations for saving.

transitory income is zero. Other forms of the PIH suggest that the MPC out of transitory income will be low but
greater than zero.
4
It is worthwhile to note that, from this perspective, many economic theories may be viewed as stimulus-response
theories (rather than stimulus-organism-response theories) because they do not consider any endogenous subjective
factors (Olander & Seipel, 1970, p. 44).
5
Consumer sentiment is believed to be a function of the evaluation and expectations people have of the economic
circumstances of the nation and their own households. In other words, if people’s perceptions of household finances,
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Behavioral Theories
In addition to economic, psychological, and sociological theories, there are a few
behavioral theories of saving. Although these theories are partly rooted in economics, they do
not assume that saving and consumption preferences are fixed, nor do they assume that
individual economic behavior is determined simply by preferences and economic resources.
Instead, individuals are expected to respond to--and even create their own--behavioral incentives
and constraints.
The primary behavioral theory is the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis (Shefrin & Thaler,
1988) which is grounded in an “economic theory of self-control” (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981).
Thaler and Shefrin suggest that an individual can be viewed as an organization which includes
both a planner and a doer: “The planner is concerned with lifetime utility, while the doer exists
only for one period and is completely selfish, or myopic” (1981, p. 394). In order for the doer to
manifest some degree of self-control, his preferences must be modified, his incentives altered, or
his set of choices constrained. Quite frequently, according to Thaler and Shefrin, individuals
adopt rules which restrict the doer’s opportunities to spend. These rules may be externally
imposed, although individuals voluntarily place themselves under these restrictions (e.g., a
Christmas saving account), or self-imposed (e.g., “rules-of-thumb,” such as avoiding borrowing
or restrictions on borrowing except for specific purchases). With these rules in mind, household
saving is seen as “the result of the successful and sophisticated imposition of welfare-improving,
self-imposed constraints on spending” (Maital & Maital, 1994, p. 7).

unemployment and inflation levels, interest rates, and so forth are pessimistic, households are more likely to
postpone consumption and save for future security (Katona, 1975).
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Institutional Theories
Institutional theories of saving are grounded in the notion that individual and household
saving is shaped by the institutional processes through which saving occurs. They are part of a
larger body of institutional theory emphasizing that societal institutions shape, and give meaning
to, individual behavior (see, e.g., Gordon, 1980; Neale, 1987). Sherraden (1991) has proposed a
theory of welfare based on assets which emphasizes the role of institutions in asset
accumulation.6 According to Sherraden, “asset accumulations are primarily the result of
institutionalized mechanisms involving explicit connections, rules, incentives, and subsidies” (p.
116). He emphasizes the subsidies provided through housing- and retirement-related tax
benefits, including deductions for home mortgage interest and property taxes, deferment and
exclusion of capital gains on sales of principal residences, exclusions for employment-sponsored
pension contributions and earnings, deferments for Individual Retirement Accounts and Keogh
Plans, and employer contributions to employee pension plans.7 Because these mechanisms for
asset accumulation are subsidized or receive preferential tax treatment, Sherraden claims that it is
rational for individuals who have access to these institutions to accumulate assets:
...institutionalized arrangements provide tremendous access and incentives to
accumulate assets. People participate in retirement pension systems because it is
easy and attractive to do so. This is not a matter of making superior choices.
Instead, a priori choices are made by social policy, and individuals walk into the
pattern that has been established. (p. 127)
Existing Theories and Saving in Low-Income Households
In their current stages of development, none of the existing theories provides a suitable
explanation for saving and asset accumulation in low-income households. The mainstream
6

Institutions, according to Sherraden, are “formal and informal socioeconomic relationships, rules, and incentives,
including the organization of capitalist enterprises and voluntary associations, and all the laws, procedures, and
agents of the state that affect organizations and households” (1991. p. 124).
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economic theories described above are inadequate for many reasons. Although the PIH and the
LCH have been very influential in the field of economics, the simplest versions of the theories do
not appear to reflect reality. As explanations of saving in the general population, these theories
have been criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Additional weaknesses are
apparent when these theories are applied to saving in low-income households.
Most fundamentally, both the LCH and the PIH assume that individuals have (or act as if
they have) almost-perfect vision regarding future income flows, prices, household consumption,
and life span and that they manifest rationality and self-control as they prepare for retirement.
However, as Bernheim and Scholz (1993) suggest,
...the life cycle decision is extraordinarily complex, in that it requires an
individual to contemplate labor earnings, investment strategies, macroeconomic
trends, and a vast assortment of risks, all over a very long time frame. It would be
surprising if the average individual, in isolation, with no practice and little or no
training, would act as a perfectly rational, farsighted utility maximizer. (p. 87)
Since low-income individuals are likely to have limited financial sophistication, they are
particularly unlikely to make optimal long-term decisions regarding saving and consumption.8
There are other reasons that individuals may not adhere to their optimal lifetime
consumption profiles. The ability to smooth lifetime consumption requires that households have
incomes during their later working years that exceed their consumption needs (enabling them to
pay off debts and save for retirement) and that they have savings which can act as a cushion--or
have access to credit--when current income is low. In reality, imperfect credit markets and
uncertainties regarding future income may prevent households from borrowing against future
income, so that they are unable to finance optimal consumption (Modigliani, 1986; Smyth,
7

According to a survey by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1988), 75% of 401(k) plans provided some sort of
matching or unconditional employer contribution.
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1993). Individuals with irregular earnings or with low lifetime earnings are particularly likely to
face binding credit constraints. Moreover, many low-income individuals may never have
earnings that substantially exceed their consumption needs.
In addition to these theoretical weaknesses, empirical evidence regarding the LCH and the
PIH is ambiguous, at best. The fact that many cross-sectional studies of saving reveal an inverted
U-shaped saving pattern across age categories is often cited as evidence for the LCH. The results
of several time series tests are also consistent with the LCH and the PIH. In these instances,
however, there may be more accurate alternative explanations. As Smyth (1993) and Green
(1984) point out, observed patterns of “hump-saving” are not necessarily consistent with the
precise pattern predicted by the LCH and do not rule out competing hypotheses. In other words,
the failure of empirical tests to refute the LCH or the PIH does not prove that these models offer
the best explanation of saving.
There are other, more specific, challenges to the LCH and PIH. Empirical studies suggest
that household consumption may be more sensitive to changes in transitory or current income
than either of these models would predict. Not only are yearly consumption patterns too highly
correlated with income, but over the life-cycle, young and old individuals appear to consume less
than these models predict while the middle-aged consume more (Thaler, 1990). Furthermore,
contrary to LCH and PIH predictions, it appears that predictable changes in income result in both
consumption and saving changes rather than changes in saving alone (Wilcox, 1991).9
Empirical evidence also challenges the fungibility assumption, the belief that various
forms of wealth (both present and future) are very easily substitutable for one another. This
8

In fact, empirical studies suggest that the majority of Americans lack the financial sophistication and information to
make even basic economic calculations (Bernheim, 1994).
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assumption implies that changes in one form of saving will be offset by changes in other forms
and that the marginal propensity to consume out of all types of wealth should be equal. In a
review of several related studies, however, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) note that no researcher has
found a complete (or even nearly complete) offset in savings when mandatory pension
contributions increased, and some have found positive effects of pension saving on other saving.
The existence and magnitude of offsetting effects from public policies designed to increase
private saving is also the subject of much debate.10 And, contrary to the fungibility assumption,
it appears that the marginal propensity to consume out of pension wealth and home equity are
quite low (Thaler, 1990).
Finally, empirical studies indicate that the asset accumulation of low-income households
is much less consistent with LCH predictions than that of wealthier households (Bernheim &
Scholz, 1993; Diamond & Hausman, 1984; Hubbard, Skinner & Zeldes, 1995). In fact,
Bernheim and Scholz (1993) claim that “patterns of asset accumulation among those without
college education [and presumably with lower permanent incomes] bear little or no resemblance
to the patterns that emerge from standard economic theories” (p. 74). Despite evidence that
wealth accumulation among the poor is not simply a scaled-down version of that of the rich,
mainstream economists have given very little attention to low-income saving. In particular, they
have generally ignored the obstacles to saving faced by low-income households and instead have
emphasized the role of individual preferences.11

9

The LCH and PIH imply that predicted changes in income will result in changes in saving rather than consumption,
because individuals will have already adjusted their consumption to these anticipated changes.
10
See, e.g., Engen, Gale & Scholz, 1994; Feenberg & Skinner, 1989; Gravelle, 1991; Hubbard, 1984; Hubbard &
Skinner, 1996; Poterba, Venti & Wise, 1993; 1994; 1995; Venti & Wise, 1986; 1987; 1990; 1991; 1992; Wise,
1987; 1995.
11
Despite the weaknesses described here, it is important to note that the life cycle model continues to be the starting
point for most neoclassical studies of saving. As life cycle models become more sophisticated (i.e., with fewer
simplifying assumptions or more realistic assumptions), they may better explain saving and wealth accumulation,
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By considering variables in addition to economic factors, and by examining individual
and household decision-making processes, psychological and sociological propositions may
complement economic theories of saving. Again, however, few of these propositions explicitly
attempt to explain the saving or asset accumulation of low-income households. Even more
importantly, empirical support for these propositions is fairly limited. Many propositions have
not been tested. Studies that do examine psychological and sociological variables often suggest
that they play a minor role in saving decisions, relative to economic variables (e.g., Furnham,
1985; Lunt & Livingstone, 1991; Pritchard, Myers & Cassidy, 1989; Van Raaij and Gianotten,
1990).
Behavioral theories of saving have also devoted little attention to low-income saving, and
there have been few direct tests of behavioral propositions. Nonetheless, some of these
propositions, if confirmed empirically, might be integrated into an institutional theory of saving.
Like institutional propositions, behavioral propositions imply that the characteristics of saving
mechanisms have important effects on saving behavior. For example, the idea that
precommitment constraints reduce the “psychic costs” (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981, p. 399) of saving
is quite similar to the institutional notion of facilitation.
The only theory described here which explicitly attempts to explain patterns of lowincome saving is the institutional theory of saving articulated by Sherraden (1991). Sherraden
(pp. 128-131) posits that the low saving rates and limited asset accumulation of low-income
individuals might by partly explained by their relatively limited access to institutional saving
opportunities and incentives. Empirical evidence suggests that institutionalized asset

even among low-income households. For example, the modification to the LCH proposed by Hubbard et al. (1995)
appears to help explain why the saving of many low-income households does not conform to standard LCH
predictions.
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accumulation is more substantial than discretionary saving (Bernheim & Shoven, 1988;
Bosworth, Burtless & Sabelhaus, 1991; Kotlikoff, Spivak & Summers, 1982; Shefrin & Thaler,
1988; Thaler, 1990), but scholars have not yet developed and tested a bona fide institutional
theory of saving.

A GENERAL MODEL OF SAVING
This section develops a general model of saving by specifying important relationships.
Rather than focusing on particular variables, this model outlines relationships between broad
categories of variables. As a starting point, it is important to distinguish saving from asset
accumulation. Saving, as defined here, refers to the act of consuming less than one’s income.
Although saving may be a residual phenomenon (Katona, 1975, p. 230-33), the primary emphasis
here is deliberate decisions to defer consumption. The primary indicator of saving in this paper
is saving rate, the percent of income that is not consumed. Asset accumulation refers to a stock
of wealth. Variables in this category include net worth, net financial assets, and so forth.
Although issues related to low-income asset accumulation are worthy of additional investigation,
this paper focuses almost exclusively on saving.12
A simple model of saving is presented in Figure 1. Here, demographic variables (e.g.,
income, wealth, age, and education) and psychological variables (e.g., preferences, motives for
saving, expectations) predict saving. Given the emphasis on individual characteristics, this
model is referred to as the individual model of saving. Although many would acknowledge that
this model is oversimplified, it is argued here that when individuals assume that poor people

12

The difference between saving and asset accumulation is quite important, but many scholars fail to make an
explicit distinction, largely because they use ambiguous terminology. In particular, many use the word “saving” to
refer to both concepts. In this paper, “saving” refers to flows of money (i.e., income in excess of consumption),
while “assets,” “wealth,” and “savings” are used interchangeably to refer to stocks of economic resources.
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cannot or will not save, they have--implicitly or explicitly--adopted an individual model of
behavior and outcomes. Note in particular that this model is largely consistent with conventional
neoclassical theories of saving.
Figure 2 portrays a more complex model of saving. As the title implies, this model
emphasizes the effects of contextual variables by adding sociological and institutional variables.
In addition to the effects of demographic and psychological variables, this model suggests that
sociological variables (e.g., neighborhood quality, reference group norms) affect saving; that
institutional variables (e.g., financial education, rates of return) affect saving; and that
sociological and demographic variables predict institutional variables. It is argued here that the
contextual model offers a more complete understanding of saving. This model builds on all of
the existing theories of saving. It does not ignore the role of individual characteristics but
highlights the contextual influences identified by sociological, behavioral, and institutional
theories. The rest of this paper considers the contextual model in more detail, with an emphasis
on low-income individuals.

ABILITY TO SAVE
As mentioned previously, Katona (1951; 1975) posits that both ability to save and
willingness to save are important determinants of saving. From this perspective, low-income
individuals may have lower saving rates because they are less able to defer consumption and/or
because they are less willing to defer consumption. This section considers issues related to the
ability to save.
Obstacles to Saving
Saving is often defined as disposable income minus consumption. This simple equation
indicates that both consumption and saving must be financed from one’s economic resources and
13

that individual saving rates will (inversely) reflect consumption decisions. To some extent,
consumption patterns are a function of individual choices. However, there is some minimum
level of consumption which is necessary for survival. Individuals and households with incomes
below this minimum cannot afford to save, because survival needs cannot be “deferred”
(Birdsall, Pinckney & Sabot, 1996; see also Bhalla, 1980; Bunting, 1997; Wang, 1995; Zellner,
1960).13 In other words, no matter how strong their motives for saving, some individuals cannot
save. Even at levels above this bare minimum, those with limited economic resources have
limited abilities to save. Therefore, the inability to reduce consumption, or to reduce
consumption very much, may partly explain why low-income households have lower saving
rates.14
An exploratory study of 20 low-income households living in extreme poverty
neighborhoods (Finn, Zorita & Coulton, 1992; 1993) identified several important obstacles to
saving and asset accumulation. Most fundamentally, these families found it extremely difficult
to defer consumption because many of their basic needs were unmet (see also Silverman, 1997a).
Those who were able to accumulate some financial savings frequently found that recurring crises
(e.g., unemployment, illness, unexpected car expenses, network obligations, and so forth)
repeatedly forced them to deplete their savings. With these obstacles in mind, Finn et al. (1993)
suggest that “managing without,” rather than delayed gratification, characterizes the lives of the
extremely poor. Although the attitudes and behaviors of the poor and non-poor may be quite

13

This minimum threshold clearly varies from person to person and with geographic location. For example, some
individuals must consume more food, health care, shelter, and clothing.
14
This notion is consistent with existing theories of saving. For example, the life cycle hypothesis predicts that
patterns of saving and dissaving will be associated with age or stage in the life cycle--because these stages are
associated with different levels of economic resources and different consumption needs. In fact, since youth is
associated with low transitory income, the LCH implies that many low-income individuals may have low saving rates
because they are at early stages in their careers, are raising children, and so forth. However, this proposition
provides little insight into the saving behavior of those with low permanent incomes.
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similar, the rewards for these attitudes and behaviors differ dramatically: “For the better-off
classes in our society self-denial is often the first step in a process that ends up in increased
savings. Postponing gratification funnels resources into higher level options” (Finn et al., 1993,
pp. 15-16). For the extremely poor, however, managing without is oriented toward short-term,
survival needs and involves long-term deprivation, rather than long-term goals. 15
Those who live in high poverty neighborhoods face additional obstacles to saving. Finn
et al. (1993) found that, for low-income individuals residing in neighborhoods with poverty rates
greater than 30 percent, saving in the form of home ownership was extremely difficult: Home
maintenance and taxes were costly, house fires and burglaries were common, and housing values
frequently declined (see also Scanlon, 1996). Similar obstacles faced those who tried to
accumulate other material goods, such as typewriters, sewing machines, clothes dryers, and
vehicles:
Besides the fact that the poor cannot afford to accumulate material assets,
experience has also told them that the items they can afford to buy are not reliable,
and they are likely to be stolen, burned, repossessed, broken down, or otherwise
unavailable in the future. Maintaining and possessing these items seems to add
more vulnerabilities, i.e., taxes, attorney’s fees, banking charges, and licenses,
than benefits. (Finn et al., 1992, p. 22)
In other words, even when individuals manage to qualify for a mortgage, obtain some material
goods, or accumulate some financial savings, the extent to which they can build on--or even
maintain--these assets is limited.

15

Additional studies (e.g., Edin, 1991; Edin & Lein, 1997; Rank, 1994, Chapter 4) document how difficult it is for
poor individuals to finance basic expenses, and income remains an important predictor of wealth even when
variables such as race, education, age, occupation, and work experience are controlled (Oliver & Shapiro, 1995,
Table 6.1). As Finn et al. (1993) suggest, more research is needed to determine “where on the income distribution
managing without can become delayed gratification; i.e., where essentials of life are not neglected, and where the
expectation of material reward or payback can be termed realistic within a reasonable period of time” (p. 19).

15

Saving Capacities
The significance of the above obstacles to saving should not be underestimated. At the
same time--despite substantial obstacles--many low-income individuals in the U.S. do save
money. For example, 119 federally chartered community development credit unions, which
serve predominantly poor neighborhoods, had a mean savings per member of $1,166 in 1995.
This figure was 85 percent of the mean savings per member at all of the more than 3,800
comparably sized credit unions in the country (Silverman, 1996). Although these figures are not
ideal indicators of saving capacity,16 they do suggest that some low-income individuals can and
do save money. Anecdotal evidence also indicates that low-income individuals save to purchase
homes and cars, send their children to college, and start their own businesses, to name just a few
initiatives.17
Even when poor families are not actively saving, empirical studies suggest that they
frequently manifest the behaviors and attitudes that are expected to foster asset accumulation.
For example, many low-income individuals strive to reduce their expenses by using coupons,
buying in bulk, and conserving energy. They budget, keep track of available public and
charitable benefits, and occasionally postpone cashing checks--until a month before Christmas,
for example--as a means of restricting their spending. Despite the obstacles, many low-income
families--even those in extreme poverty neighborhoods--remain committed to and take pride in
home ownership. In more rewarding contexts, this type of motivation, self-control, management
skill, and planning behavior would likely result in saving and asset accumulation (Finn et al.,
1993).
16

These are mean figures (median figures were not provided) for individuals who had some formal savings.
Moreover, not all of these members could be considered low-income, though many did have quite limited incomes.
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Although the contexts are quite different, empirical studies in developing countries
provide additional support for the assertion that low-income individuals can and do save money.
For example, research in Indonesia suggests that, even when formal saving institutions are
unavailable, low-income rural households save in the form of hoarded cash, gold, animals,
agricultural products, and so forth (Robinson, 1994). Additional research in Indonesia and
Bolivia shows that when rural households have access to appropriately-designed deposit
accounts,18 they are willing to save in formal institutions and accumulate substantial savings
(Robinson, 1994; see also Adams, 1978).
In sum, low-income households face formidable obstacles to saving and asset
accumulation. To a large extent, therefore, income-related differences in saving may reflect
differences in the ability to save. At the same time, many low-income individuals demonstrate
self-control, motivation, and management and planning skills, and low-income individuals in a
variety of countries have accumulated substantial savings. Instead of assuming that low-income
individuals are unable to save, we should identify variables which help to explain saving and
asset accumulation and identify ways to facilitate low-income saving. The obstacles to saving
discussed in this section suggest that asset development strategies should be supplemented by
programs and policies which meet basic needs19 and--for those in extreme poverty
neighborhoods--neighborhood stabilization or community development strategies. These
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It is also important to note that not all poor families live in high poverty neighborhoods. In 1990, 28% of the
poverty population in the one hundred largest central cities lived in census tracts with poverty rates of at least 40%.
Sixty-eight percent lived in census tracts with poverty rates of at least 20% (Kasarda, 1993).
18
Liquidity appears to be particularly important (Robinson, 1994).
19
“In order for managing without to become the kind of longer-term planning and delayed gratification necessary for
assets to accumulate in a real sense, basic needs must be met. If they are not, the small savings account will always
be expended on an uninsured medication, a utility deposit, or a brief, but satisfying self-reward” (Finn et al., 1993, p.
17).
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initiatives would make some degree of deferred consumption possible and would make savings
(especially material assets) more secure (Finn et al., 1993; Scanlon, 1996).

SAVING IN LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: KEY VARIABLES
The previous section demonstrates that having limited economic resources makes it
difficult--but not necessarily impossible--for low-income families to defer consumption.
However, since the most widely available studies of income and saving report bivariate statistics
only, it is important to consider additional variables which might help to explain observed
patterns. Of interest here are variables which are correlated with income but which are also
likely to have direct effects on saving rates. (One might argue that these variables affect
“willingness” to save.) The following subsections identify demographic, psychological,
sociological, behavioral, and institutional variables that may help to explain alleged incomerelated differences in saving rates.
Demographic Variables
Demographic variables which may impact saving include education, stage in the life
cycle, employment status, wealth, and race.
Education
Since education is strongly associated with income (Acs & Danziger, 1993; Becker, 1992;
Murphy & Welch, 1989), alleged income-related differences in saving may be explained in part
by differences in education, especially for those with low permanent income. Several studies
(e.g., Bernheim & Garrett, 1996; Diamond & Hausman, 1984; Solmon, 1975) indicate that
saving rates increase with education, even after considering a variety of control variables.
Solmon also found that motives for saving varied with education: Less-educated individuals were
more likely to report providing for emergencies as their primary savings goal, while those with
18

more education cited the desire to provide for children’s education and to help them set up
households. Since educated individuals appear to have longer time horizons, Solmon suggests
that education may alter individual preferences. On the other hand, he acknowledges that
direction of causality may be reversed (i.e., individual preferences may affect both saving
behavior and the amount of education obtained.) Although it is likely that education affects
willingness to save, more research is needed to confirm this hypothesis and to identify the
mechanisms through which this process occurs.
Stage in the Life Cycle
As discussed previously, the life cycle hypothesis asserts that asset accumulation is highly
correlated with age or stage in the life cycle (Ando & Modigliani, 1963; Modigliani & Ando,
1957; Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954). It is also possible that age or stage in the life cycle affects
one’s willingness to save, by altering preferences and/or motives for saving. Early economists
(e.g., Fisher, 1930; Jevons, 1911) asserted that willingness to defer consumption was negatively
associated with youth. Whether or not “thriftiness” or “impatience” is involved, it is likely that
the need to save for retirement becomes more salient as individuals age (see, e.g., Avery,
Elliehausen & Gustafson, 1986). However, other motives for saving are likely to be just as
salient, if not more so, during the early adult years. More empirical research is needed to
determine if stage in the life cycle is significantly associated with willingness to save and if so,
whether this relationship helps to explain saving in low-income households.
Employment Status
Employment status is likely to have important indirect effects on saving rates. Full-time,
year-round employees are more likely to have access to institutionalized saving mechanisms
(e.g., employer-sponsored pension plans); financial information and education; saving subsidies
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(e.g., employer contributions to pension plans); and payroll deduction. To the extent that
institutional variables affect saving (see discussion below), employment status may help explain
saving in low-income households.
Wealth
The LCH and PIH imply that saving is inversely related to wealth: When a household
experiences an increase in wealth, it is expected to consume both the added interest income and
some portion of the increase in principal (Wilcox, 1991). However, wealth may be positively
related to saving, at least for some individuals. First, rather than experiencing diminishing
marginal returns from increases in wealth, low-wealth, low-income individuals who begin to
save may become increasingly motivated to save additional money.20 Second, those with greater
wealth generally have access to higher rates of return (consider certificates of deposit, for
example). If attractive rates of return encourage saving (see discussion below), then those with
greater wealth have stronger incentives to defer consumption. Additional research is needed to
determine the relationship between wealth and saving, particularly at low levels of wealth.
Race
Empirical evidence indicates that race is strongly related to asset accumulation (see, e.g.,
Eller & Fraser, 1995, Table F; Oliver & Shapiro, 1995, Tables 6.1 and 6.2). It is not clear,
however, that race has an independent effect on saving rates. Although the bivariate relationship
between race (i.e., being non-white) and saving is likely to be negative, this relationship may be
largely explained by income or by other variables discussed in this paper. For example,
relatively low saving rates of particular non-white groups might be attributed to lower average
educational attainment, lower aspirations and expectations, and/or different reference group
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In fact, Katona (1975) articulates this very hypothesis (discussed below under psychological variables).
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norms. It is quite likely that many minorities have limited access to institutionalized saving
mechanisms and saving incentives, at least partly due to job quality and neighborhood quality
issues. Again, more multivariate research is needed to determine whether race has an
independent effect on saving.
Psychological Variables
Psychological variables which may affect an individual’s willingness to save include
financial knowledge and understanding, motives for saving, rate of time preference, and
aspirations and expectations for success.
Financial Knowledge and Understanding
The extent to which an individual understands the process and benefits of asset
accumulation is likely to have a positive effect on willingness to save. Most fundamentally,
those who understand the mechanics and likely outcomes of a saving strategy are more likely to
take advantage of a favorable saving opportunity. Conversely, individuals with a limited
understanding of a 401(k) plan, to take one example, may not realize the financial benefits of
participation or may simply shy away from something unfamiliar.
Although empirical evidence suggests that most Americans have relatively limited
financial knowledge and understanding (see, e.g., Bernheim, 1995; Ng, 1992), it is likely that
financial sophistication varies by socio-economic status. For example, both Solmon (1975) and
Kaufmann (1984) found that financial knowledge varied with education, and Bernheim and
Scholz (1992) found that the financial behavior of college-educated individuals reflected more
sophisticated planning. To the extent that education and income are correlated, this relative lack
of financial information and understanding may partly explain why low-income households have
lower saving rates.
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Motives for Saving
While it is common to associate interest in motives with psychologists, economists have
long been interested in motives for saving. For example, Adam Smith (1776/1993) speculated
that “...the principle which prompts us to save, is the desire of bettering our condition, a desire
which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves
us till we go into the grave” (p. 203). John Maynard Keynes (1936/1958, pp. 107-8) identified
several motives for saving, both economic and psychological.21
More recently, neoclassical economists have emphasized four motives for saving,
including the desire: (1) to maintain consumption in the face of income fluctuations, particularly
during retirement; (2) to prepare for income shocks and other emergencies (precautionary
saving); (3) to transfer wealth to future generations (bequest motive); and (4) to purchase “big
ticket” items such as consumer durables, education, or a vacation (target saving). The first three
are expected to influence long-term saving, and the fourth to affect short- to medium-term saving
and dissaving patterns (Sturm, 1983).22 Empirical studies suggest that Americans generally cite
retirement, emergencies, and education as the primary motives for saving (Avery et al., 1986;
Bernheim, 1994; see also Modigliani, 1988; Sturm, 1983). However, it is quite possible that the
salience of particular motives varies by socioeconomic status (see, e.g., Solmon, 1975; Avery et
al., 1986). These differences may help to explain alleged income-related differences in saving
rates.
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These motives include: (1) precaution--to build a reserve against unforeseen events; (2) foresight--to bridge an
anticipated gap between future income and needs; (3) calculation--to enjoy interest earnings and value appreciation;
(4) improvement--to enjoy gradual improvements in a standard of living; (5) independence--to enjoy a sense of
autonomy and agency; (6) enterprise--to carry out a business enterprise; (7) pride--to bequeath a fortune; and (8)
avarice--to satisfy personal miserliness.
22
At the same time, as Owens (1993) suggests, “...these motives are not mutually exclusive, and saving decisions
will generally be influenced by more than one of them” (p. 106).
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Several existing theories of saving postulate that saving is motivated by the desire to
smooth or maintain consumption levels. For example, the permanent income hypothesis
suggests that changes in income which are perceived as transitory will have little effect on
consumption patterns. Versions of the relative income hypothesis (e.g., Brown, 1952;
Duesenberry, 1949; Modigliani, 1949) posit that households base their consumption decisions on
previous income or consumption standards and that households seeking to maintain habitual
behavior will not reduce consumption when income decreases.23 If these propositions are true,
individuals with low transitory incomes may have lower savings rates than other households
because they are striving to maintain a particular level of consumption. Since low transitory
income is associated with youth, the life cycle hypothesis also implies that the desire to smooth
consumption will result in below-average savings rates for many low-income households.
While these phenomena may help to explain saving among individuals with low
transitory income, they provide little insight into the behavior of individuals with low permanent
income. Two other propositions address the saving of individuals with low permanent income
but with contradictory predictions. On one hand, since the expected length of retirement should
be positively associated with retirement saving, low-income individuals--because they have
lower life expectancies--may perceive less of a need to save for retirement. On the other hand, to
the extent that low-income individuals have less certain future income (or expect consistently
low future income), they may be more motivated to save for precautionary reasons (see, e.g.,
Deaton, 1991; Sturm, 1983).
Empirical evidence from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances indicates that lowincome families were less likely to mention retirement as an important reason for saving.
23

These ideas have been articulated more recently in the “habit persistence” literature (e.g., Constantinides, 1990;

23

However, low-income families were no more likely than others to cite a precautionary motive
(Avery et al., 1986). These figures may be biased by the lack of control variables, particularly
age. Clearly, more empirical research is needed to determine if differences in motives for saving
help to explain observed income-related differences in saving.
Rate of Time Preference
The notion of preference refers to the fact that individuals rank order “goods.” In other
words, they prefer--with varying intensities--some goods over others. Although particular
preferences vary from person to person, neoclassical economists assume that individual
preferences are given (i.e., exogenous) and stable. Economists also assume that, within a given
set of opportunities and constraints, these preferences determine individual behavior.
Several types of preferences are likely to affect saving behavior. For example, some
individuals have a strong preference for expensive items or for leisure time, some strongly dislike
being in debt, and some are more risk-averse than others. In this context, however, the
preference which has received the most attention is rate of time preference. Rate of time
preference refers to the ratio of the utility of a current dollar and the utility of a dollar delayed
one year.24 It is a measure of an individual’s willingness to defer consumption. Neoclassical
economists assume that fully rational individuals in perfect capital markets will have marginal
rates of time preference that equal market rates of interest.
At the same time, the unpleasantness or “disutility” associated with postponed
consumption is assumed to vary across individuals (Olander & Seipel, 1970), and many have
noted that the rates of time preference of poor households are higher than those of wealthy

Powell, 1993; Sundaresan, 1989).
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households. In particular, Lawrance (1991) has used data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics to argue that poor households tend to have relatively high rates of time preference and
marginal propensities to consume and therefore that the poor are less “patient” than the rich.
Mainstream economists often emphasize rates of time preference as a key explanation for
differences in saving behavior between poor and wealthy households.
There are many reasons to believe that the conventional economic analysis of time
preference rates does not capture the complexity of low-income households’ behavior and
experiences. According to Dynan (1993), socioeconomic differences in the rate of time
preference noted by Lawrance (1991) might instead reflect group-specific shocks to wealth.25
Lawrance also acknowledges that part of the difference in estimated rates of time preference may
reflect the fact that rich and poor households face different lending rates (i.e., they have access to
different economic returns on money saved). In fact, when Lawrance modifies her model so that
households with above-median incomes save at the Treasury bill rate and below-median
households save at the passbook rate, the difference between the time preferences of rich and
poor households is not significant. On the other hand, Lawrance assumes that households do not
face binding liquidity constraints. To the extent that low-income households are liquidity
constrained, this assumption may bias downward estimated rates of time preference.26
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Or, in non-economic terms, it refers to “the percentage premium or bonus required to make a person indifferent
between an immediate ‘reward’ (income, TV sets, chocolate bars) and a deferred, larger reward“ (Maital & Maital,
1977, p. 181).
25
Lawrance’s (1991) analysis is based on rates of consumption growth. She assumes that higher consumption
growth reflects patience, because households have demonstrated a willingness to defer consumption from early to
later in life. Dynan (1993) argues, however, that a socioeconomic group that experienced a net positive shock to
wealth would have above-average consumption growth. In fact, controlling for changes in the relative wages of
different socioeconomic groups eliminates the difference in consumption growth rates associated with educational
attainment.
26
Since liquidity constraints force households to defer consumption, they appear to be more “patient.”
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If income-related differences in rates of time preference remain, one might argue that the
existence of an inverse relationship between income and time preference does not necessarily
imply that the poor are less “patient" than the rich. Maital and Maital (1977) suggest that higher
rates of time preference may reflect mistrust of promised future rewards. Perhaps more
importantly, apparent differences in time preference may simply reflect differences in economic
resources. To the extent that economic resources are inadequate or almost inadequate for basic
household needs, low-income households are likely to find postponing consumption much more
difficult than wealthier households. At very low consumption levels the marginal cost of
exercising willpower is very high (Birdsall et al., 1996; Deaton, 1991; Shefrin & Thaler, 1988).27
In fact, since poor households often choose to go without one particular need (winter coats, for
example) in order to fulfill another need (perhaps heat for the home), one could argue that limited
economic resources force low-income households to be more patient than affluent households.
These counter-arguments suggest that more research is needed to clarify the role of time
preference and other preferences. Certainly preferences are likely to affect individual saving to
some extent. For example, an individual who strongly prefers current consumption over deferred
consumption will be less inclined to save. Time preference may not, however, explain as much
variance in saving as economists imply.
Aspirations and Expectations of Success
In addition to individual preferences and motives for saving, aspirations and expectations
of success are likely to affect saving. Those who do not expect their saving attempts to be
“successful” are unlikely to try to save. In a study of saving in Britain, Furnham (1985) found
27

There is also a fair amount of empirical evidence suggesting that most people have marginal rates of time
preference that exceed rates of interest (see, e.g., Hausman, 1979; Thaler, 1990). In other words, most people have
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that beliefs about the pointlessness of saving were negatively associated with income, even
though lower-income individuals recognized the benefits of saving. He interprets this finding in
light of learned helplessness:
...Although people may believe that saving is by-and-large beneficial, because
they cannot or do not save they find themselves in a hopeless position. Thus,
saving may be seen as pointless for them (because it is too difficult or the sums
that may be saved are too little) but they believe that it is beneficial for others who
can save. (p. 369)
This phenomenon may help to explain lower saving rates among low-income individuals.
Since the possibility of accumulating even a fairly small amount of savings probably seems
remote to many low-income individuals, some poor individuals may not even attempt to save. In
fact, Furnham (1985) suggests that “these feelings of helplessness may...serve to maintain low
levels of saving even when ability to save increases” (p. 369).
In part, individual saving-related aspirations and expectations will be determined by past
experiences, including past asset accumulation experiences. According to aspirations theory
(Lewin, Dembo, Festinger & Sears, 1944), an individual’s aspirations are raised (lowered)
according to her success (failure) in achieving them. Applying this proposition to economic
behavior, Katona (1975) suggests that an individual who makes progress toward a savings goal is
more likely to raise that goal. Conversely, those whose attempts to save money are unsuccessful
are likely to lower their saving aspirations. To the extent that individuals with low permanent
incomes have had limited success with saving in the past, this proposition suggests that they may
not even attempt to save money. At the very least, they are likely to set lower savings goals.

fairly strong preferences for current rather than future consumption and are frequently tempted to increase current
consumption by borrowing.
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These propositions are consistent with Shen’s (1991) claim that effort choice is a product
of both economic and psychological variables:28
Effort choice is clearly an issue that involves past, present, and future. It is
determined by the configuration of current needs and future aspirations, shaped by
a person’s initial endowments and past experience. Only by incorporating
intertemporal mutual feedbacks of both economic and psychological variables can
we hope to understand the dynamics of effort choice, and--ultimately--explain the
economic profile of a person’s life. (p. 277)
Sociological Variables
Sociological variables that may affect an individual’s saving include socialization and
social learning, the norms of his reference group, and the socio-economic characteristics of the
neighborhood in which he lives.
Socialization and Social Learning
A small body of literature considers the role of economic socialization in the
development of saving-related values, attitudes, and behaviors. Cohen (1994) argues that
consumer behavior begins in the family: “Money management skills, as well as consumer
attitudes and values, emerge under the direct or indirect tutelage of parenting adults and older
siblings” (p. 244). In particular, Cohen suggests that individual saving and spending habits are
modeled after family habits. There is some empirical support for this notion. Bernheim and
Garrett (1996, Table 6) found that reports of parental saving were significantly related to saving
rates and indicators of wealth, even after accounting for a large number of control variables.
Pritchard et al. (1989) found a strong positive correlation between the saving patterns of
adolescents and parents, and Lunt and Livingstone (1992, p. 121) found that 88 percent of their
sample of British men and women attributed their own attitudes toward money to their parents.
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Although Shen (1991) is writing about work effort, many of his ideas may be applied to saving effort as well.
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Social learning theory (Rotter, 1954) has also been used to explain the ability to defer
gratification, a characteristic which is closely related to rate of time preference (Lea, Tarpy &
Webley, 1987). This theory suggests that the ability to delay gratification may be learned and
therefore implies that the explanation for time preference lies in environmental variables.
Although family attitudes and behaviors are likely to play an important role, some empirical
evidence suggests that time preference rates of children and adolescents can be modified by
modeling (e.g., children may witness others postponing gratification) or by direct
reinforcement.29
These propositions and findings suggest that part of the income-saving relationship may
be explained by differences in economic socialization and social learning. It is quite likely that
low-income individuals are exposed to less modeling of saving: To the extent that low-income
individuals are surrounded by similar others (see, e.g., Feld, 1981; 1982; Fischer, 1982; Marsden,
1990), they are likely to have family members, neighbors, and peers who also find saving quite
difficult. Poor individuals are also likely to receive less direct reinforcement for their own
saving. For example, individuals with limited assets have access to lower interest rates and
fewer saving options. Furthermore, the asset restrictions associated with many means-tested
programs almost certainly imply that participants in these programs have been subject to negative
rather than positive reinforcement.30
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See Maital and Maital (1977, pp. 190-191) for a review. However, Maital and Maital also claim that the
propensity to delay gratification is quite stable after adolescence.
30
Several welfare programs have eligibility restrictions that limit program participation to individuals with minimal
assets (usually $1500, excluding home equity). For program participants, these rules place an implicit tax rate of
100% on wealth above asset limits (Hubbard et al., 1995).
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Reference Group Norms
One version of the relative income hypothesis (Duesenberry, 1949) calls attention to the
influence of an individual’s reference group (e.g., neighbors, coworkers, members of his ethnic
group) on his saving. Duesenberry posits that an individual seeks to obtain a standard of living
which conforms to the standard of living of his reference group. Thus, consumption habits are at
least partly determined by social and cultural needs. When income declines, saving rates are also
expected to decline so that individuals can maintain their desired standards of living. When
income rises, saving is expected to increase.31
This proposition implies that low-income households are less likely than wealthier
households to save money. First, consider a reference group comprised of other low-income
households. To the extent that members of this reference group face many obstacles to saving,
saving is unlikely to be a group norm. Therefore, those whose saving is influenced by this
reference group are less likely to save money, even when saving is possible. Second, a lowincome individual who has a reference group with a higher standard of living is likely to allocate
the majority of her disposable income to consumption (rather than saving) in an attempt to
conform to the reference group’s living standard. Since wealth and consumption are highly
visible and highly valued in the United States, the latter phenomenon may substantially limit
saving in low-income households. At the same time, changes over time in perceived
“necessities” and increases in the socially-defined minimum consumption level may result in low
saving rates or even dissaving among lower-income groups (Bunting, 1997; see also Easterlin,
1974).
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There is preliminary empirical support for this proposition: Kosicki (1987) found that income rank was an
important determinant of saving rates, after controlling for permanent income.
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Neighborhood Characteristics
A previous section considered the effects of neighborhood quality on ability to save.
Those who live in high-poverty inner city neighborhoods may also be less willing to save-particularly in the forms of home ownership and durable goods--if they fear that their assets will
be burglarized, vandalized, damaged by fire, and so forth. Thus, saving may be partly predicted
by neighborhood “quality.” In addition to this relationship, there are likely to be important
relationships between the socio-economic characteristics of a neighborhood and a variety of
institutional variables. Residents of inner city neighborhoods are likely to have limited access to
convenient saving institutions and limited access to home ownership (because banks are less
likely to finance mortgages and insurance companies less likely to insure homes). To the extent
that these institutional variables affect saving, these neighborhood characteristics may help to
explain lower saving rates in low-income households.
Behavioral Variables
In addition to demographic, psychological, and sociological variables, behavioral
variables such as consumption patterns and strategies of financial management may affect an
individual’s willingness to save.
Consumption Patterns
Given the inverse relationship between consumption and saving (when income is held
constant), it is important to consider the effects of consumption patterns on saving. However,
consumption patterns may be largely explained by other variables proposed here. A previous
section argues that willingness to save is “irrelevant” if one’s income does not exceed a certain
minimum threshold. It is in this context that consumption most strongly affects the saving of
low-income individuals. Above this minimum, however, consumption patterns reflect some
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degree of individual choice. For example, individual preferences and the strength of motives for
saving will shape consumption decisions. Other relevant variables are likely to include
education, stage in the life cycle, aspirations and expectations, socialization and social learning,
the desire to conform to reference group norms, and access to institutionalized saving
opportunities that facilitate and promote saving (see discussion below).

Strategies of Financial Management
A few scholars have proposed that individuals who utilize particular strategies of
financial management will have higher saving rates. For example, because non-savers were
more likely to report using “flexible” strategies of financial management, Lunt and Livingstone
(1991) suggest that people save by adopting a fixed saving plan (i.e., setting aside a certain
amount each month). According to Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and Maital and Maital (1994; see
also Maital, 1986), individuals often utilize a variety of self-imposed “precommitment
constraints” to shape their saving behavior. These techniques make it difficult to choose current
pleasure at the expense of future pleasure or involve borrowing to finance current consumption
(because the commitment to pay off a loan restricts future spending) (Strotz, 1956). For
example, individuals arrange for overwithholding of their income taxes, purchase life insurance,
or use payroll deductions to save for retirement. In particular, Maital and Maital view mortgagefinanced home purchases as a key precommitment strategy.32
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This practice facilitates saving because mortgage payments are a contractual obligation and because the part of
each payment that goes toward principal increases the buyer’s home equity. In fact, Maital and Maital (1994)
suggest that the desire for this precommitment mechanism is as strong a motivation for mortgage-financed home
purchases as the incentive created by the tax-deductibility of interest payments. See also Katona’s (1975, pp. 230233) discussion of contractual saving.
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Since these constraints are largely contractual in nature, they force individuals to be
“willing” to save. Individuals who choose to utilize precommitment constraints are therefore
more likely to save regularly. Since these techniques reduce individual discretion regarding the
amount to be saved, participants are also likely to save more than those who rely solely on “will
power.”33
For a variety of reasons, low-income individuals may be somewhat less likely to utilize
precommitment constraints. First, these decisions require some degree of financial knowledge
and understanding. While purchasing a home clearly requires a substantial amount of financial
sophistication, even the relatively simple act of increasing one’s income tax withholding requires
some financial knowledge. Second, these commitments require a minimum level of economic
resources (e.g., the ability to postpone some current consumption and, in some cases, a down
payment and the apparent financial means to make regular loan payments). Third, purchases
financed with loans generally require a decent credit record. Low-income households,
particularly those with low permanent incomes, may have difficulty meeting some or all of these
criteria. Consequently, income-related differences in the use of precommitment constraints may
help to explain lower savings rates in low-income households.
Institutional Variables
The final class of explanatory variables is institutional in nature. As described earlier, an
institutional perspective on saving emphasizes that characteristics of saving opportunities
influence saving and asset accumulation. For our purposes, it is helpful to consider four key
institutional variables: (1) access; (2) financial information and education; (3) incentives; and (4)
33

In a comparison of saving behavior in West Germany and the United States in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s,
Strumpel (1975) concluded that, in Germany, “the variety of promotion programs led to a high degree of
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facilitation. Institutional theories of saving predict that individuals who have access to
institutional saving mechanisms; who receive appropriate financial education; who are offered
attractive incentives; and whose saving is actively facilitated (e.g., through payroll deduction)
will save a greater percentage of their incomes. A fifth institutional variable, access to credit,
may also affect the saving of low-income households.
Access to Institutionalized Saving Mechanisms
Those who have access to institutional mechanisms of saving are likely to have higher
saving rates than those who lack such access. For example, the fact that a job offers a pension
plan may prompt an individual to begin saving for retirement, because saving becomes
convenient, because she believes her savings will be secure, or perhaps simply because she
perceives the opportunity as new and interesting.34 However, many low-income households lack
access to the mechanisms which currently facilitate saving among middle- and upper-income
households (Sherraden, 1991, pp. 128-131). For example, members of low-income households
are less likely to be in employment situations that offer retirement pension plans.35 As Sherraden
(1991) concludes, “certain screening processes--especially parentage, type of employment, and
level of income--determine whether or not individuals have an opportunity to benefit from
institutionalized asset accumulation” (p. 116). These patterns suggest that differences in access
may partly explain observed income-related differences in saving.

habitualization and contractualization of saving behavior and thus tended to relieve the motivation to save from the
continuous competition with instant consumption” (p. 213).
34
Alter, Goldin & Rotella (1994) argue that the establishment of savings banks in the early 1800s increased
aggregate saving “by making it easier and safer for individuals to save” (p. 736). Cagan (1965) and Carroll and
Summers (1987) suggest that pension plans and sheltered saving plans create a “recognition effect.” In other words,
the very availability of institutionalized saving opportunities, by calling attention to the need for and benefits of
saving, may promote saving.
35
For example, in 1991, only 18.8% of families with income between $10,001 and 20,000 were eligible for 401(k)
plans, compared to 52.6% of families with income between $50,001 and 75,000 (Engen et al., 1994, Table 2).
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Financial Information and Education
An earlier section posits that financial knowledge is likely to be positively related to
willingness to save. If this proposition is true, then financial information and programs of
financial education should increase saving rates. A growing body of empirical evidence supports
this proposition. For example, Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz (1996) found that frequent
retirement education seminars were positively associated with higher 401(k) participation rates
and contribution rates. Similarly, Bernheim and Garrett (1996) found that the availability of
retirement education strongly increased participation in 401(k) programs, contributions to
401(k)s, and overall rates of saving. The fact that low-income individuals have less access to
financial education (see, e.g., Bernheim & Garrett, 1996) may help to explain differences in
saving.
Incentives
An institutional perspective of saving assumes that individuals manifest a fair amount of
rationality and predicts that individuals will save more if attractive incentives for saving are
offered. However, whether or not individuals do increase their saving rates in response to saving
incentives has been the subject of much debate. There are two key issues. First, for net savers,
an increase in the after-tax rate of return may have two contradictory effects. Individuals may
choose to save more because the price of current consumption increases relative to the price of
future consumption (the substitution effect). On the other hand, with higher rates of return,
individuals can save less and still enjoy the same amount of future consumption (the income
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effect). Existing empirical studies have not yet established if the substitution effect outweighs
the income effect (see, e.g., Boskin, 1978; Evans, 1983; Kauffmann, 1993; Summers, 1981).36
The second issue involves the fact that changes in the rate of return on savings may
simply result in the “reshuffling” of assets, with no net new saving. This issue has stimulated
much debate, particularly with regard to tax-deferred saving plans for retirement (e.g., IRAs and
401(k) plans).37 To the extent that public policy seeks to increase aggregate private saving rates,
this issue is of fundamental importance. However, it may be less relevant to our interest in lowincome saving: Reshuffling is less likely for low-income households, since they are less likely to
have savings outside of these structures.38
Although the debate concerning tax-deferred retirement plans has not yet been resolved, it
is interesting to examine recent research regarding other saving incentives and disincentives.
Feldstein (1992) found that college scholarship rules which reduce financial aid as parents’
income and assets increase provided a strong disincentive for some families to save for college
and even for their own retirement. Recent research also suggests that asset restrictions associated
with means-tested programs limit the saving of low-income households, even those which are not
actual but potential program recipients. 39 In a survey of community development credit union
members, Silverman (1997a) found that 49 percent of public assistance recipients agreed with the
36

In economic terms, the interest elasticity of saving is still uncertain. Empirical estimates generally fall between
zero and 0.4 (Engen et al., 1994, p. 141), with positive estimates reflecting net saving. There is a related discussion
regarding the effects of taxes and inflation on saving (see, e.g., Boskin, 1978; Bovenberg, 1989; Kauffmann, 1993;
Kotlikoff, 1984; Owens, 1993).
37
See, e.g., Engen, Gale & Scholz, 1994; Feenberg & Skinner, 1989; Gravelle, 1991; Hubbard, 1984; Hubbard &
Skinner, 1996; Poterba, Venti & Wise, 1993; 1994; 1995; Venti & Wise, 1986; 1987; 1990; 1991; 1992; Wise,
1987; 1995.
38
Empirical data indicate that most IRA contributors have relatively little wealth (Summers & Carroll, 1987), and
empirical analysis simulating the effects of private pension plans suggests that pensions do not offset personal saving
among lower-income (less-educated) workers (Bernheim and Scholz, 1993).
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statement “I would save more, but the government would cut my benefits if I did.” Using the
National Longitudinal Survey of Women to examine state-level variations in Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC, recently replaced by Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families), Powers (1995) found that a one dollar difference in the AFDC asset limit was
associated with a 30-cent difference in the assets of potential AFDC recipients. Econometric
modeling by Hubbard et al. (1995) also indicates that asset-based means tests can restrict the
saving of potential program participants. 40
As discussed above, Sherraden (1991) emphasizes that low-income individuals have less
access to institutions which subsidize saving, such as tax deductions for mortgage interest
payments and tax-deferred and/or employer-matched pension programs. At the same time, lowincome households receiving means-tested welfare benefits often face disincentives to saving in
the form of asset restrictions. If additional empirical evidence confirms that saving rates are
positively related to saving incentives and negatively related to disincentives, then different
patterns of saving incentives and disincentives may help to explain income-related differences in
saving.
Facilitation
Finally, an institutional theory of saving would predict that individuals whose saving is
actively facilitated will have higher saving rates. A primary method of facilitation is payroll
deduction. For example, when pension plan contributions are deducted from an individual’s
paycheck, temptations to spend that money are eliminated, and the participant no longer has to
make, on a monthly or biweekly basis, a conscious decision to postpone consumption. Her
39

If an individual anticipates that an earnings downturn or large medical expenses might necessitate participation in
one of these programs (and require her to dissave in order to be eligible), she may voluntarily restrict her asset
accumulation (Hubbard et al., 1995).
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“willingness” to save is, in effect, guaranteed.41 Since low-income individuals are less likely to
work for companies that provide institutional saving mechanisms, they are less likely to enjoy
this type of facilitation. Therefore, differences in access to active facilitation may help explain
differences in saving.
The institutional variables and propositions outlined thus far challenge the assumption
that low-income individuals cannot save, will not save, or, at the very least, will not save in
formal saving institutions. In this way, they are consistent with the “new paradigm” of
microfinance in developing countries articulated by Robinson (1995). This new paradigm
assumes that low-income individuals can save, that they already demonstrate financial discipline,
and that there is a demand for formal financial services, if these services are appropriately
designed. In fact, Robinson attributes the lack of institutional saving among low-income
households to the predominance of the “old” paradigm:
It is still widely assumed that the poor savings record of many rural financial
institutions demonstrates that the tendency to save in rural areas is low. What it
usually demonstrates, however, is a lack of appropriate institutions and
instruments. This misconception, in turn, leads to severe underemphasis of the
importance of building rural financial institutions. (1992, p. 94)
Although these “new” assumptions must be confirmed in other settings, it is quite likely that lowincome households in developed countries will also respond favorably to the provision of
appropriate institutional saving opportunities. 42
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Findings from a fourth study (Silverman, 1997b) were inconclusive.
In a study of community development credit union members, 48% of respondents said that direct payroll deposit
(into savings) would make it easier for them to save (Silverman, 1997a).
42
In fact, empirical studies in the U.S. indicate that 401(k) participation rates among families that are eligible for
these plans are quite similar for a variety of income levels. For example, in 1991, 67.4% of eligible families with
incomes between $10,001 and $20,000 participated in 401(k) plans, compared to 70.5% of eligible families with
incomes between $50,001 and $75,000 (Engen et al., 1994, Table 2; see also Poterba & Wise, 1996). More recent
research in Indonesia also suggests that the banking needs of lower-middle income households in urban
neighborhoods are similar to those of rural households (Robinson, 1994).
41
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Access to Credit
In addition to the institutional characteristics just described, access to credit--or the
converse, liquidity constraints--may also affect the saving and asset accumulation of low-income
households, although the net effects are somewhat ambiguous. Liquidity constraints refer to the
inability to freely substitute one form of wealth for another, most commonly from an inability to
borrow against future labor income (Wilcox, 1991; Zeldes, 1989). Since liquidity constraints
prevent some individuals and households from financing optimal consumption when income
declines, they may be unable to smooth out their consumption as the PIH and LCH models
predict.
Individuals with low permanent incomes--because they are more likely to have sporadic
employment income and to lack other forms of collateral--are particularly likely to be denied
credit. Somewhat paradoxically, those who face liquidity constraints may be more motivated to
accumulate precautionary saving, since they will be unable to borrow in the event of a crisis (see,
e.g., Deaton, 1991; Sturm, 1983). On the other hand, to the extent that saving to purchase a
home would be a strong motive for saving in the absence of liquidity constraints, the inability to
obtain a mortgage may reduce saving.

Thus, willingness to save is likely to be shaped by a number of demographic,
psychological, sociological, behavioral, and institutional variables. With a few exceptions (e.g.,
economic background, age, and race), these variables reflect a complex mix of individual choices
and opportunities or constraints. For example, an individual’s education and income are a
function of her choices (e.g., willingness to invest in human capital and number of hours worked)
and her opportunity set (e.g., intellectual ability, health status, family background, quality of
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available education, financial aid opportunities, and labor supply and demand issues). Likewise,
the use of precommitment constraints may reflect individual preferences (e.g., risk aversion and
willingness to defer short-term income) as well as opportunities and constraints related to
information, access, incentives, and facilitation.
Given the emphasis here on saving in low-income households, it is important to note that
opportunities and constraints vary substantially by income--and by other variables such as
education and occupation that are strongly correlated with income. For example, public policies
promote saving and asset accumulation for many middle- and upper-income families through
housing- and retirement-related tax benefits. On the other hand, public policies actually
discourage saving and asset accumulation for many low-income households, through asset
restrictions in means-tested social welfare programs. Characteristics of one’s job are also
critical. Employers of many middle- and upper-income workers facilitate saving and asset
accumulation by providing subsidized saving mechanisms and payroll deduction arrangements.
Relatively few low-income workers have access to these opportunities and incentives. These
patterns suggest that apparent income-related differences in saving and asset accumulation may
be largely related to differences in opportunities and constraints rather than individual motives
and preferences.

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
This review of theory and evidence demonstrates that researchers need to devote more
attention to saving in low-income households. In all disciplines, empirical evidence related to
saving in low-income households is extremely limited, particularly because there are relatively
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few multivariate studies. In short, we know very little about how and why low-income
individuals save.
This paper has taken beginning steps to develop a theory of low-income saving. First, a
general model of saving was proposed (Figure 2). This model suggests that demographic,
psychological, sociological, and institutional variables affect saving and that demographic and
sociological variables predict institutional variables. The contextual model stands in contrast to
the individual model (Figure 1), in which saving is simply the product of demographic and
psychological variables. Although the individual model is clearly oversimplified, it is argued
here that those who assume that poor people cannot or will not save have--implicitly or
explicitly--adopted an individual model.
This paper also examined issues related to the ability to save. Clearly, low-income
households face formidable obstacles to saving--most fundamentally, the fact that income rarely
covers basic expenses. To a large extent, therefore, income-related differences in saving rates
may reflect differences in the ability to save. At the same time, low-income individuals in a
variety of countries have accumulated substantial savings, and even when they are not actively
saving, many low-income individuals demonstrate attitudes and behaviors (e.g., self-control,
motivation to save, and management and planning skills) that in more favorable contexts would
likely result in saving and asset accumulation. Instead of assuming that low-income individuals
are unable to save, researchers should identify other variables which help to explain saving and
asset accumulation. The obstacles to saving discussed in this paper suggest that asset
development strategies should be supplemented by programs and policies which meet basic
needs and--for those in extreme poverty neighborhoods--community development strategies.
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The remainder of this paper identified additional variables that are likely to predict saving
in low-income households. Consistent with the contextual model of saving, it is argued that
opportunities and constraints (whether real or perceived) shape behavior at least as much as
individual characteristics such as motives and preferences. In particular, in addition to the
constraints associated with very limited incomes, it is argued that low saving rates may be largely
explained by lack of access to institutional mechanisms that facilitate and reward saving.
A number of testable propositions regarding saving in low-income households are
provided in Table 1. Empirical tests of these propositions would have important research
implications. First, since we have very little empirical evidence related to low-income saving,
the focus on low-income households is long overdue. Second, since the predominant theories of
saving (i.e., the life cycle hypothesis and the permanent income hypothesis) implicitly focus on
the middle- and upper-classes, the findings would enable us to make a more comprehensive
evaluation of these theories. Finally, this research could serve as a direct test of particular
institutional propositions.
Empirical tests of these propositions would also have important policy implications.
Recent discussions of social welfare have emphasized the importance of assets to individual and
household well-being, and empirical studies are beginning to confirm that asset holding has
positive effects on economic security, personal well-being, the well-being of children, and other
outcomes. In the last several years, a number of state and local programs have begun to include
asset accumulation as part of their anti-poverty initiatives. Empirical tests of the suggested
propositions would help policy-makers and program directors make informed decisions about
social welfare and anti-poverty strategies.
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Despite the potential for research and policy implications, it is important to emphasize
that this is an early stage of theory-building. Empirical evidence will likely alter some of the
propositions. Unanticipated relationships may prove to be important. (For example, particular
psychological variables, e.g., expectations of failure or the desire to obtain consumption levels
comparable to those of the non-poor, might prove to be more powerful than institutional
incentives to save.) We have much to learn about saving and asset accumulation in low-income
households. Identifying key variables and developing testable propositions are first steps toward
the development of a theory of low-income saving. Empirical tests of these propositions will
further the specification of such a theory and provide important information to those interested in
the well-being and development of impoverished households and communities.
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TABLE 1. PROPOSITIONS REGARDING
SAVING IN LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS
(Numbers refer to the numbered paths in Figure 2.)
1. Demographic variables affect institutional variables.
a) Income is positively associated with access to secure saving institutions.
b) Income is positively associated with access to saving mechanisms that are subsidized via
tax deferments.
c) Income is positively associated with access to financial education.
d) Wealth is positively associated with rates of return on saving.
e) Full-time employment is positively associated with access to saving mechanisms that are
subsidized via tax deferments.
f) Full-time employment is positively associated with access to financial education.
g) Full-time employment is positively associated with access to saving subsidies in the form
of employer contributions to pension plans.
h) Full-time employment is positively associated with access to payroll deduction.
2. Sociological variables affect institutional variables.
a) Neighborhood quality is positively associated with access to convenient saving
mechanisms.
3. Demographic variables affect saving.
a) Income is positively associated with saving.
b) Age is positively associated with saving.
c) Education is positively associated with saving.
d) Race is associated with saving.
4. Institutional variables affect saving.
a) Access to secure saving mechanisms is positively associated with saving.
b) Access to convenient saving mechanisms is positively associated with saving.
c) Financial education is positively associated with saving.
d) Attractive rates of return are positively associated with saving.
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e) Saving-related subsidies (i.e., employer matching contributions, tax benefits) are positively
associated with saving.
f) Facilitation (e.g., payroll deduction) is positively associated with saving.
g) Asset-restrictions for means-tested transfer programs are negatively associated with saving.
5. Sociological variables affect saving.
a) Neighborhood quality is positively associated with saving.
b) Growing up with adults who save money is positively associated with saving.
c) Reference group saving is positively associated with saving.
d) Income that is low relative to one’s reference group is negatively associated with saving.
6. Psychological variables affect saving.
a) Financial knowledge is positively associated with saving
b) Strong motives for saving are positively associated with saving.
c) Expectations regarding the “success” of saving are positively associated with saving.
d) Rate of time preference is negatively associated with saving.
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FIGURE 2.
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